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Abstract
The labour productivity index is a mainstay measure for comparing countries’ rela-
tive economic performance, but the Covid-19 pandemic could expose some of its 
inherent limitations: it focuses on people in work and ignores unemployment, and it 
is not standardised. In theory, a country’s index value could increase, even though its 
GDP might fall, because of significant increased unemployment in low-productivity 
sectors such as tourism and retail. It follows that the index value could fall when 
these sectors recover. Also, high-performing countries could see their index value 
fall because of the pandemic’s impact in high-value sectors, such as demand for oil.
Consequently, a wider perspective of productivity is necessary. This paper, there-
fore, proposes a complementary index which adjusts labour productivity for levels 
of unemployment—the social labour productivity index (SLPI)—and recommends 
that the labour productivity index itself should be standardised. The relationship 
between employment and productivity is complex. For example, the UK’s economic 
performance, involving comparatively low labour productivity and low unemploy-
ment, has been deemed a ‘productivity puzzle’. A literature review discusses this 
relationship, but it is clear that econometric worldwide evaluation requires very 
large data sets, that are unlikely to be routinely available in practice to monitor inter-
national performance. By contrast, data sets on national productivity are small and 
already available, although they contain little or no data on causal factors. SLPI val-
ues were calculated for differing levels of unemployment and relative labour produc-
tivity for newly employed workers for countries where data was available; with pat-
terns over the period 1986–2016 established for the G7 countries, Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece, and Spain. There were marked variations between the two indices for coun-
tries with high unemployment. The SLPI presents a practicable measure which can 
be utilised quickly in these unprecedented times. Using available data to compare 
countries’ GDP with their total workforce, it arguably provides a better measure of 
their overall economic and social health. Sensitivity analyses varying assumptions 
can model differing potential scenarios to sit alongside GDP and labour productivity 
index predictions.
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Introduction
The economic theory of productivity measurement goes back to the work of Jan 
Tinbergen (1942) and independently, to Robert Solow (1957), and is continually 
evolving [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
2001]. A wide range of productivity-related indicators are currently utilised [Office 
for National Statistics (ONS) 2016a]. One mainstay indicator for comparing coun-
tries’ relative economic performance is the labour productivity index. However, the 
Covid-19 pandemic could expose some of its inherent limitations: it focuses on peo-
ple in work and ignores unemployment, and it is not standardised. The pandemic is 
expected to have far-reaching and long-term effects on the global economy with sig-
nificant increases in unemployment, particularly in low-productivity service sectors 
such as tourism, leisure, and retail which employ lower-skilled workers (see below). 
In theory, this could mean that the rate of reduction in a country’s GDP is exceeded 
by its rate of increase in unemployment, with the possible consequent counter-intu-
itive effect that the value of the labour productivity index actually increases. A cor-
ollary is that the index value could fall if and when these low-productivity sectors 
recover. Also, there could be major volatility in some countries’ GDPs where the 
pandemic impacts on high-value sectors, such as the demand for oil (Barbosa et al. 
2020), leading to high-performing countries seeing their index values fluctuate and/
or fall as a result. Such volatility would serve to illustrate why the labour produc-
tivity index itself should be standardised. Given these circumstances and unprece-
dented times, a wider perspective of productivity is necessary. This paper, therefore, 
proposes a practicable complementary index which uses available data to compare 
countries’ GDP with their total workforce, thereby adjusting labour productivity for 
levels of unemployment. It is considered that this social labour productivity index 
(SLPI) provides a better measure of countries’ relative overall economic and social 
health.
Impact of Covid‑19 pandemic on world economy
At the time of writing (July 2020), the full impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on 
the world economy and individual countries is a matter for conjecture, with many 
projections being made with varying degrees of certainty. It is fair to say that the 
outlook is generally pessimistic. For example, the International Labour Organiza-
tion initially reported that the impact could cause the equivalent of 195 million job 
losses (United Nations News 2020) due to the full or partial lockdown measures 
that had been put in place, which affected almost 2.7 billion workers, i.e., four in 
five of the world’s workforce. The four sectors likely to experience the most ‘dras-
tic’ effects of the disease and falling production were: food and accommodation 
(144 million workers), retail and wholesale (482 million); business services and 
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administration (157 million); and manufacturing (463 million). These sectors were 
described as being at the ‘sharp end’ of the impact of the pandemic, and account 
for 37.5% of global employment; and they all mainly involve high employment and 
low productivity. Yet within a very short time, the International Labour Organiza-
tion (2020) increased its projected job losses to the equivalent to 305 million, due to 
the prolongation and extension of lockdown measures, with the situation worsening 
for all major regional groups. Particular concern was expressed that the worst-hit 
industries and services in low- and middle-income countries have high proportions 
of low-wage workers in informal employment, with limited access to health services 
and State welfare safety nets (United Nations News 2020). However, the pandemic 
impacted on the major G7 economies as well as the rest of the world, with jobless 
totals varying between countries; ranging from 1.76 million in Japan to 30 million in 
the United States (Kretchmer 2020).
Oil and natural gas extraction has long been the sector with the highest productiv-
ity, but this too has been severely hit by the pandemic because of reduced demand 
because of lockdowns; with air and car travel significantly reducing. This has led 
to the industry experiencing its third price collapse in 12 years. Following the first 
two shocks, the industry rebounded and business returned to usual, but the Covid-19 
pandemic combined a supply shock with an unprecedented demand drop when the 
sector’s financial and structural health was worse than in previous crises. The advent 
of shale, excess supply, and generous financial markets that overlooked the limited 
capital discipline all contributed to poor returns. As a result, in May 2020, share 
prices touched 30-year lows (Barbosa et al. 2020). The knock-on effect on employ-
ment in some oil-producing centres has been marked; foreign workers in the Gulf 
were ‘stranded, unemployed and forgotten’, with reports of some being deported 
(Brennan 2020). Together with increasing societal pressure for renewable energy 
and reduced dependency on fossil fuels (Neill 2019), arguably change is inevitable 
and the pandemic crisis could be seen to be one of the industry’s most transforma-
tive moments, with the impact on productivity and employment uncertain (Barbosa 
et al. 2020).
Another high-productivity sector is real-estate activities, and property mar-
kets around the world will also probably suffer significantly due to the pandemic, 
because large unemployment, wage cuts, business failures, and job uncertainty will 
mean many people are likely to be cautious about investing in a home. This in turn 
can lead to falling house prices, as witnessed in the UK, USA, and many other coun-
tries during the last recession and credit crunch (Bloom 2020).
Should outbreaks of the pandemic persist, should restrictions on movement be 
extended or reintroduced, or should disruptions to economic activity be prolonged, 
the anticipated recession could be deeper than predicted. Businesses might have dif-
ficulty in servicing debt, heightened risk aversion could lead to climbing borrowing 
costs, and bankruptcies and defaults could lead to financial crises in many countries 
(World Bank 2020). Some countries’ economies have high reliance on sectors which 
are vulnerable to the impact of the pandemic. For example, tourism is particularly 
important for Spain and Italy, which accounts for 14.3% and 13.0%, respectively, 
of their GDP (McCarthy 2020), and this involves sectors that have been highlighted 
above as being the most adversely affected by the pandemic. Countries instigated 
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measures to encourage (safe) tourism from mid-2020, but Christine Lagarde, the 
European Central Bank president, advised that ‘the economic recovery from the 
pandemic hit would be “restrained” as households save instead of spending’. She 
warned that some airlines and hotels would suffer ‘irredeemable’ damage (Business 
telegraph 2020). In respect of food, a wave of [United Kingdom (UK)] restaurant 
insolvencies was anticipated to be caused by the pandemic, following on from losses 
at the top 100 restaurant groups, which increased by 94% to £151 m in the previous 
year. Of those that survive, a number were likely to look at reducing the number of 
sites, cut menus, and make further redundancies, especially once the UK furlough 
scheme ended (Jones 2020).
By way of comparison, some manufacturers maintained their business (to some 
degree) by taking the opportunity to switch their production to commodities relevant 
to the pandemic, such as personal protective equipment. For example, over 100 UK 
manufacturers of all shapes and sizes responded positively to the government’s call 
for help building ventilators (Williamson 2020).
There can be no doubt that the impact of the pandemic across the world will be 
significant economically, and will probably have long-lasting consequences for some 
countries and some sectors. The above points are illustrative and cannot be totally 
exhaustive, particularly as there is uncertainty about whether there will be further 
waves (Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine 2020) and what might be the associ-
ated impact. Also, the capacity for governments to mitigate the worst effects of the 
pandemic was uncertain at the time of writing (Bank of England 2020; BBC News 
2020; Her Majesty’s Government 2020; KPMG 2020). Nevertheless, there can be 
confidence that: productivity values in many sectors will change, some on a long-
term basis; each country’s profile in terms of its balance of sectors will evolve; GDP 
values will fall (some temporarily and some more long-term); and unemployment 
will rise. It is therefore very likely that countries’ labour productivity indices will 
fluctuate more widely and frequently over a short period than in the past; with the 
counter-intuitive possibility that some will have their index value increase even 
though their GDP has reduced, if their unemployment rate has markedly increased 
enough, with low-productivity sectors bearing the brunt of job losses. Therefore, it 
is important that consideration can be given to how a country’s GDP relates to its 
whole (available) workforce, and not just those who are actually employed. This is 
why the SLPI is proposed.
Literature review
Any literature review relating to productivity and unemployment cannot be totally 
exhaustive and it must be kept in mind that some research findings may not read-
ily translate into the post-Covid-19 world. This literature review examines the UK’s 
‘productivity puzzle’, discusses some employment practices that can affect produc-
tivity, and highlights some relevant international dynamics, such a migration. There 
are inter-relationships between these (and other) topics and there will be variations 
in how they affect different countries. However, it is important to bear in mind that 
immigration, whether it be legal or illegal, or involve high-skilled technical workers 
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or low-skilled refugees, may well increase the size of the available workforce, but 
it will not necessarily increase the numbers in work (at least proportionately). It is 
the difference between those in work and the total workforce that the SLPI looks to 
address.
UK’s ‘productivity puzzle’
There is unanimity in the literature that productivity matters: it is the key to ris-
ing living standards (Haldane 2017; Tenreyo 2018). There is also wide agree-
ment that the UK’s labour productivity (Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per hour 
worked) is problematic both in absolute terms, since it stalled around the time of the 
2008 financial crisis, and in relative terms, in that it is some way adrift of the rates 
achieved by the UK’s principal competitors (see Fig. 1). This has led to comments 
such as the following:
‘If British workers were able to catch-up to the G7 average, what currently 
takes us five days’ work to produce could be done in a little over four. If we 
were able to catch up with Germany, we might all be able to go home from 
work on Thursday afternoon each week without any fall in GDP.’ (Tenreyo 
2018, p.5).
However, if the UK’s labour productivity is so adrift over the medium-to-long 
term, there should be evidence of its impact on living standards. GDP per head is 
the most common measure of living standards, and is one of the three components 
of human development—and arguably the most important—used by the United 
Nations (UN) in its annual calculations of the progress of the world’s economies 
(United Nations Development Programme 2018). Figure 2 compares British, French, 
and German GDP per head over almost 40 years. Two things stand out. First, the gap 
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Fig. 1  Productivity, constant price, GDP per hour worked, 2007 = 100 Source: Office for National Statis-
tics (2018a)
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between the UK and France, which was evident in 1980, had closed by the time of 
the financial crisis in 2008 and, in 2018, the UK had the slightly higher figure. Sec-
ond, although German GDP per head remained above that of the UK, the gap had 
not widened; indeed, at times it narrowed. Neither of these things should be evident 
in the presence of a secular decay of UK labour productivity.
In these circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that there may be conceptualiza-
tion and measurement problems with GDP per head or with UK labour productivity. 
It is argued in this paper that a re-conceptualization of productivity that takes into 
account differences between countries’ unemployment levels is a step towards pro-
viding a more nuanced interpretation of how productive economies actually are. It is 
important to note that issues in the labour market are but one possible contribution 
to an understanding of the UK’s ‘productivity puzzle’. Other interrelated dimensions 
of what is almost certainly a multiply-determined phenomenon include: problems of 
measurement that tend towards an underestimation of UK labour productivity (Bean 
2016); crisis-related scarring that has ossified resource allocation (Haldane 2017); 
insufficient work-related training (Dearden et al. 2006); and low private and public 
investment (Kierzenkowski et al. 2018) where private investment may be inhibited 
by distortions imposed by the corporate tax system (Bournakis and Mallick 2018a, 
b).
Labour hoarding
One theoretical influence on the value of a country’s labour productivity rests on 
the concept of labour hoarding. Labour hoarding is the retention of workers by 
firms during periods of slow economic growth or outright recession during which 
the expected dominant process might be labour shedding (Bryson and Forth 2016; 
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Fig. 2  GDP per head, constant prices PPP 2011 int. dollar, 1980–2018 Source: International Monetary 
Fund (2019)
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Crawford et  al. 2013); the likely impact being to dampen both productivity and 
unemployment rates. The founding theorization of this process is due to work in the 
1960s by Arthur Okun (Biddle 2014) who argued that, in contrast to the long-held 
classical view, labour was not a factor of production that could be fired and rehired 
without cost. Dismissal and recruitment necessitate resource commitments: these 
processes are not free. Neither are they perfect substitutes: firms’ employees develop 
skills and aptitudes that may be permanently lost should redundancies occur in an 
economic downturn. The rationale for labour hoarding becomes even stronger in an 
environment where real wages are depressed and the direct cost of retaining workers 
falls.
Labour hoarding may be part of the explanation of the labour productivity slow-
down experienced by several European economies and the UK in particular since 
the 2008 financial crisis and the recession that followed (Dolphin and Hatfield 
2015). Evidence from the UK shows that, in the aftermath of the crisis, firms tended 
to retain workers, but constrain wages and investment; this was particularly true of 
smaller firms that invested in training (Crawford et al. 2013; MAKEuk 2018). At the 
same time, firms that did shed labour tended to release less-skilled workers whilst 
retaining those with higher skills (Martin and Rowthorn 2012). Despite the depth of 
the recession in 2008–09 (a contraction of some 4.6%), and the extraordinary length 
of time it took the economy to regain its previous peak (6 years), UK unemployment 
increased less than it had done in the comparatively milder recessions in the early 
‘80 s and early ‘90 s. This was arguably because (many) firms chose to hoard labour, 
thereby to some extent limiting their capacity to squeeze productivity increases from 
the labour process: hence the link between labour hoarding and flat UK labour pro-
ductivity. The inverse happened during, for example, the ‘Thatcher’ recession of the 
early 1980s. Then, a 2.8% contraction of the economy resulted in a peak unemploy-
ment rate of almost 12%; but this dramatic labour shedding was associated with the 
sharpest short-term jump in UK labour productivity in the last 50 years.
A complementary way to conceptualise the relationship between labour hoarding 
and productivity is to accept that the UK’s low productivity is a reflection of its pref-
erence for retaining low-productivity and low-paid jobs. This, in turn, would account 
for the stagnation of UK real wages since the financial crisis. Not all sectors may 
be thus characterised as there is evidence of productivity dispersion between UK 
firms, but the long tail of low-productivity-labour-hoarding firms may account for 
the secular trend (Faggio et al. 2010).
Moreover, if national differences in labour hoarding and shedding provide a par-
tial explanation of the productivity puzzle, possibly we should be less worried about 
productivity gaps between economies because, as it stands, ‘pure’ productivity is 
an incomplete conceptualization of a complex phenomenon. For example, as noted, 
after 2008 UK firms retained people in work in the teeth of an exceptional downturn. 
Why? Following Okun’s argument (Biddle 2014): because firms supposed it com-
petitive so to do. Observe also the wider emollient effect this had on the economy as 
the abrasions and social aggravations associated with high and prolonged unemploy-
ment were limited. To take a contrasting case, in France, productivity and unem-
ployment were higher than in the UK both in the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis and across recent decades. In productivity terms, the French performance may 
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be enviable but the implications of higher unemployment—such as Okun’s costs of 
labour turnover, the problems of hysteresis and wider social costs—sit, as it were, 
outside the equation and are ignored. As will be seen in “Results”, what the SLPI 
shows is that, when adjusted for unemployment, French productivity is necessar-
ily attenuated, because the SLPI offers the beginnings of an approximation of such 
costs. It also suggests that countries that retain labour (and labour hoarding might 
be only one reason to do so) are not as adrift in economic terms as pure productivity 
comparisons suggest.
Hysteresis effects of unemployment
It is important to take account of unemployment when considering labour produc-
tivity, because high unemployment and underemployment have high economic and 
social costs—through so-called hysteresis effects—to drain vitality from economic 
recovery (Blanchard and Summers 1986; Cross 1993, 2000; O’Shaughnessy 2011). 
Short-term job losses can become long-term unemployment as unemployment-
generating structural changes in labour markets—and therefore in the economy as 
a whole—become path-dependent (Ball 2009; Røed 1997). The most durable expla-
nation of this process arises from the struggle between insiders (the employed) and 
outsiders (the unemployed and those on the margins of work) in the labour market 
(Blinder 1988). The market power of insiders in a depressed labour market allows 
them to retain their jobs as it is they who largely determine wage-setting (and not 
the outsiders who are effectively disenfranchised) (Blanchard and Summers 1986). 
The chief source of the insiders’ market power stems from the labour turnover costs 
that firms would incur in trying to dispense with the services of skilled and expe-
rienced workers (Lindbeck and Snower 1986). One implication of hysteresis is its 
enervating impact on outsiders. The long-term unemployed lose skills and the habits 
of work and may be cut adrift from the productive economy. More widely, hysteresis 
may produce an economy trapped in stagnant growth and apparently permanently 
high unemployment, both of which undermine social cohesion (International Labour 
Organization—International Monetary Fund 2010).
Investment in education
Education is a prime driver of productivity and there are risks of government 
expenditure levels on education falling in the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. Neverthe-
less, the rates of return to education may rise, as with other crises, since earnings 
for the less-educated fall because of increased unemployment rates amongst this 
group which in turn suppresses their wages. If university graduates’ earnings remain 
unchanged, or only change marginally, then the rate of return to university educa-
tion can increase during crises; particularly as better-educated workers can more 
easily find other work to maintain earnings. Less-educated workers are likely to 
take lower-paying jobs during crises, whilst more advantaged graduates may switch 
more quickly to better jobs. Also, employers may be more likely to retain educated 
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workers, because they are more adaptable to changing economic conditions (Fasih 
et al. 2020).
Youth unemployment
Linked to the education-related issues is that of youth unemployment, which has 
been an ongoing problem in countries across the world, and is likely to be exacer-
bated by the Covid-19 pandemic. This was already a problem in mid-2014 when 
the youth unemployment rate in the eurozone reached 24% (up from 15% in 2007) 
compared to 10.25% for adults (up from 6.50% in 2007) (Banerji et al. 2015 p. 6). 
Youths are three times more likely than adults to be unemployed, and over 350 mil-
lion young people are not engaged in education, employment, or training. Research 
has shown that the highest unemployment rate in 25 of 27 developed countries was 
amongst people with primary education or less, and the fact remains that those who 
have a lower level of education are less likely to be employed. The demographic 
bulge of about 3.5 billion global citizens below the age of 25 (Hannah 2014) 
means that youth unemployment should not be ignored in relation to a country’s 
productivity.
Migration and productivity
There have been substantial immigration flows into several European countries, 
such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and Italy, with the evidence point-
ing to small wage effects and possibly some negative employment effects on nation-
als. However, there are substantial variations between European countries both in 
the presence of immigrants and their labour market policies and institutions, and 
will affect the impact and absorption of immigrants. One noted phenomenon, espe-
cially in Germany and the UK, is an apparent ‘skill downgrading’ of immigrants, 
i.e., better-educated workers performing jobs comparable to less-skilled nationals. 
This might be due to barriers created by language, licensing, and legal requirements; 
but it suggests that immigrants competing more with less-educated nationals than 
similarly educated nationals (Peri 2016). Yet, it is equally important to look at the 
impact of emigration on economies. For example, Greece has been hampered in its 
economic recovery from its first bailout programme in 2010, because of the ‘brain 
drain’ of thousands of its educated citizens moving abroad and then not necessarily 
returning (Hope 2018). Also, the emigration of skilled workers has lowered firms’ 
productivity performance in Eastern European countries (Giesing and Laurentsyeva 
2017).
In addition, it should be noted that migrants can fall into quite distinct groups, 
as reflected by US immigrants being overrepresented at the two extremes of the 
skill distribution (the less-educated and better-educated); with underrepresentation 
at intermediate levels. In 2014, one-third of US workers with a PhD and a job in 
a STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) field were foreign-
born, with a possible factor being that mathematics–analytical skills are more easily 
transferred across countries than managerial and communication skills, which are 
 SN Bus Econ            (2021) 1:10 
1 3
  10  Page 10 of 38
more culture and country specific. In comparison, immigrants represented 40% of 
workers with no high school diploma. Such immigration of the better-educated may 
improve learning and promote innovation at the local level with positive productiv-
ity effects. It should also be noted that foreign students are the fastest-growing group 
of foreign-born, and tertiary education is likely to be a sector of significant growth 
for jobs, value-added, and (service) exports for the US economy. Foreign students 
increase the demand for such services and, once students graduate with a US degree, 
they can be well positioned to be productive workers and professionals (Peri 2016).
Refugees and productivity
A distinction is being made between the general migration issues described above 
and those of refugees. This is because whilst the latter are also migrants their situ-
ations and needs are quite different. At the end of 2019, there were nearly 26 mil-
lion refugees worldwide (from amongst 79.5 million who were ‘forcibly displaced’), 
with around half under the age of 18. More than half of refugees were from four 
countries: Syria (6.6 million), Venezuela (3.7 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), 
and South Sudan (2.2 million), and the major host countries for refugees were: Tur-
key (3.6 million), Colombia (1.8 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Uganda (1.4 mil-
lion), and Germany (1.1 million) (United Nations Refugee Agency 2020).
The large number of refugees and migrants has tested the European Union’s (EU) 
cohesion and decision-making ability. However, given Europe’s ageing and shrink-
ing population, migrants are seen by some to be necessary to replace missing nation-
als; thereby maintaining its capacity to keep its economies strong and its welfare 
systems sustainable (Martín et al. 2016). There are also macroeconomic benefits to 
activating refugees which are not only budgetary. It has been estimated that there 
will be a positive medium-term impact of the related increased labour supply. Tak-
ing reasonable assumptions, it was projected that the aggregate impact on EU GDP 
could be as high as 0.25 percentage points by 2020; and for the main destination 
countries such as Germany, Sweden, and Austria, it could be as high as 0.5–1.1 
additional percentage points. This would be huge for EU growth standards: equiva-
lent to, for instance, the estimated impact of EU Structural Funds in the growth rate 
in Spain in the 1990s. However, this was dependent upon the assumptions about the 
labour market integration of refugees (Martín et al. 2016).
Notwithstanding this perceived opportunity, Europe has struggled to cope with a 
large-scale influx of migrants with divisions within the EU over how best to support 
refugees. The crisis had a disproportionate impact on some countries (the largest 
intakes were to Germany, Italy, and France) and there were calls for more collabora-
tion at EU level to coordinate their integration (Persaud 2017). However, the demo-
graphic profiles of refugees are skewed towards the young and men: men constituted 
60% of asylum applicants from the ten largest countries of origin, with the figure 
rising to over 90% for Bangladesh and Pakistan; 83% of the first time asylum seek-
ers were younger than 35 years old, with those aged 18–34 years accounting for 51% 
and 32% being minors younger than 18 years. Unfortunately, refugees struggle to 
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locate employment commensurate with their skills and, consequently, the process of 
integration is often associated with downward professional mobility (Robila 2018).
Different countries set up different integration programmes for immigrant eco-
nomic integration and this has had a big impact on outcomes. Some Scandinavian 
countries developed extensive state-sponsored integration programmes, which 
included housing and employment assistance. But even countries with long experi-
ence of integrating asylum seekers (Sweden and Denmark) have found that less than 
one-third of refugees are employed after 3 years (Martín et al. 2016). By compari-
son, for example, the UK sent asylum seekers to excluded urban areas which have 
an excess of available housing but not necessarily job opportunities. Cognisance 
should also be taken of where economic incentives to access the labour market may 
be distorted by the benefits to which refugees (and asylum seekers) are entitled; this 
should be taken into account in the design of any potential labour market integration 
support measure (Martín et al. 2016).
It has been found that migrants entering their country of asylum through inter-
national protection and asylum processes have employment rates lower on aver-
age compared than migrants in general. This is mainly due to their qualification 
and skills profile, but the impact of the psychological trauma many have suffered 
also plays a part (Martín et al. 2016). Even so, where asylum seekers and refugees 
have both skills and qualifications they can experience high levels of unemployment 
(where they were allowed to work) and those employed work in low-skilled jobs 
with earnings below the average (Robila 2018).
Illegal immigration
A precondition for the existence of illegal labour immigration is the existence of an 
informal economy. This includes where there are non-declared activities, which have 
a lower-than-normal price, being agreed by the buyer and seller knowing non-decla-
ration shares savings in taxes and duties, and similar. The extent to which this affects 
a country will vary; some countries such as Portugal have marked numbers of illegal 
workers (mostly from former colonies and because of weak trade unions), whereas 
Scandinavian countries have been able to contain this problem (Hjarnø 2019). Yet 
even where laws have been put in place with increased penalties, such as the UK, 
the non-legal labour market continues to grow. To avoid exposure to the authorities 
(and possible deportation), illegal immigrants work in the shadow economy; they 
are paid in cash, are subject to low wages and poor conditions, and have no benefits 
or rights. Many illegal immigrants are brought to the country by employers, tying 
the workers to a life of inhumane conditions and no prospects (Security Watchdog 
2017). Some illegal immigrants will actually be the victims of human trafficking for 
sex, organ harvesting, and modern-day slavery, which has taken the lives of many 
adults and children over the years (Cotom 2020). All such labour is by definition not 
regulated and, therefore, difficult to measure, but the estimated cost to the UK treas-
ury is £2 billion a year, or 7% of GDP (Security Watchdog 2017). Data on numbers 
of illegal immigrants in individual countries will not be part of official employment 
statistics, and will always be the subject of research and estimation.
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Social labour productivity index
Allowing for unemployment when measuring productivity
The ONS (2018b) invited bids for small research funding grants to encourage 
research in the development of statistics to better reflect the economic environ-
ment as it evolves in multifaceted ways making economic measurement ever more 
complex. This was because of the often digitally delivered growth in services, 
the importance of intangible assets, and the continuing trend of globalisation, all 
making the understanding and quantifying of economic activity more challeng-
ing. One of the stated areas of interest for these grants was:
‘improving the quality and scope of productivity statistics to deliver a 
world-class set of statistics to support users attempting to address the “pro-
ductivity puzzle”’
Now, labour productivity is an internationally utilised economic index which 
measures how efficiently labour input is combined with other factors of production 
and used in the production process. Labour input is defined as total hours worked 
of all persons engaged in production. Labour productivity only partially reflects the 
productivity of labour in terms of the personal capacities of workers or the intensity 
of their effort. The ratio between the output measure and the labour input depends to 
a large degree on the presence and/or use of other inputs (e.g., capital, intermediate 
inputs, technical, organisational and efficiency change, and economies of scale).
The research covered by this paper emanated from the fact that labour pro-
ductivity only relates to those people in work, i.e., it excludes the unemployed. 
Therefore, there are likely to be differential impacts on countries’ productivity 
figures according to the degree to which the various factors referred to above 
apply. Also, people with high skills will be numbered amongst the unemployed 
when they are between jobs, but many (if not most) people who are unemployed 
in any country will be people with relatively low-skill profiles who are only likely 
to obtain jobs that have relatively low productivity.
The multiple factors that can affect the relationship between productivity and 
unemployment, as outlined, are manifold and complex; and past economic relation-
ships and processes may change considerably as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Some historical research and data may not readily translate for future projections. 
Ideally, there will be much econometric research to re-evaluate and re-determine the 
inter-relationships between the various factors and how to economically measure 
productivity in such a new environment. Unfortunately, this will involve a great deal 
of research effort and resource, and probably take several years. Given these circum-
stances, the proposed SLPI can act as a straightforward proxy measure that can be 
readily utilised. Its values can be calculated for differing (assumed/projected) lev-
els of unemployment and levels of labour productivity for newly employed workers 
across those countries for which appropriate data are publically available. The SLPI 
can then act as a useful complementary index to labour productivity, which can be 
further developed (see Further Research below).
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Balancing unemployment and productivity
One issue that the SLPI seeks to address is the fact that some countries with com-
paratively high labour productivity internationally can also have comparatively high 
unemployment rates, as in the quoted case of the UK in the early 1980s. Should 
countries that have high(er) productivity at the expense of high(er) unemployment 
be applauded compared to those that appear productive ‘laggards’ but manage to 
achieve, as the UK did prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, a situation as close to full 
employment as anything seen since the end of the post-WWII boom? It is important 
to take account of unemployment when considering labour productivity, because 
high unemployment and underemployment can have high economic and social costs, 
if unaddressed because of potential hysteresis effects (Blanchard and Summers 
1986; Cross 1993, 2000; O’Shaughnessy 2011). Therefore, by allowing for different 
levels of unemployment when measuring countries’ productivity levels, the SLPI 
may provide a better yardstick of their economic and social fitness.
The SLPI might also shed some light on the apparent inconsistency between 
Figs. 1 and 2. Paul Krugman’s well-known aphorism that in the long-run produc-
tivity is nearly everything implies that because of the UK’s inferiority in Fig. 1, its 
performance in Fig. 2 is hard to understand (Krugman 1994). Widening our concep-
tualization of productivity is a step towards overcoming this problem. Productiv-
ity adjusted for unemployment allows us to begin to account for an array of hidden 
costs lurking outside the traditional productivity data but which impacts, potentially 
heavily, on economic performance. Figure 1 neglects these costs, thus flattering the 
prowess of countries—like France—which are more burdened by them. The UK’s 
inconsistency across the two figures can now be explained. The UK may be behind 
in pure productivity terms, but its more recent medium-term retention of labour sug-
gests that it escapes a series of economic costs its competitors incur, meaning that 
its material prosperity is higher than might be inferred from its place in the interna-
tional productivity hierarchy.
The relationship between productivity and unemployment
A country’s overall economic and social health cannot be measured solely by its 
labour productivity. Measuring social health is complex and includes employability, 
marital satisfaction, sociability, and community involvement, and links to psycho-
logical well-being and other psychological measures. Socially healthy people may, 
because of their social health, more likely enjoy good physical health and psycho-
logical well-being, compared to people who are dissatisfied with their marriages, 
socially isolated, and/or relatively unemployable (Renne 1974). That health under-
pins wealth is reflected in the notion that healthier nations are wealthier nations 
(Contoyannis and Forster 1999), with there being two-way relationships between 
economic growth and health: economic growth acts as stimulus for good health 
and good health is considered a key determinant of growth (Deaton 2000). Also, 
improvements in health and education both lead to increased worker productivity 
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(Ullah et al. 2019). However, that there is a positive association between unemploy-
ment and a range of measures of ill health has long been known, although the rela-
tionship between the two is not straightforward (Griffin 1993; Norström et al. 2019; 
Watkins 1992). With the predicted increases in unemployment worldwide due to 
the Covid-19 pandemic (see above), there is a risk that this will have a deleterious 
impact on people’s health with knock-on effects on productivity, which in turn could 
then lead to further unemployment; a potential vicious circle. In the circumstances, 
it makes sense to monitor productivity in a way that accounts for unemployment to 
gain a wider, more rounded perspective. This would require access to regularly pub-
lished national data, but much of that necessary to appropriately accommodate all 
(or even a selection) of the factors mentioned above is not necessarily collected. Ide-
ally, the way forward would involve a considerable amount of standardised data and 
an econometric approach. Unfortunately, the requisite large data sets are simply not 
available in practice, e.g., for reasons of confidentiality/competitiveness in the pri-
vate sector. Furthermore, there would be much debate about exactly what would be 
the most appropriate data, given that most insights have been gained by individual 
research, which have focused on particular disciplines, issues, and research ques-
tions, often in a single country. The development and agreement of such data and 
how it should be analysed, on a worldwide basis, would take a long time. Therefore, 
to make early progress, any initial step should look to utilise existing data, as far as 
possible, whilst taking account of the fact that data sets on national productivity are 
small and contain little or no data on causal factors.
One premise underpinning the proposed SLPI is the fact that some countries with 
‘good’ labour productivity can have ‘poor’ unemployment rates. Therefore, compar-
ing GDP with a country’s total workforce is arguably a better measure of a coun-
try’s overall economic and social health. Figure 3 shows the relationship between 
labour productivity, i.e., GDP per hour worked (GDPHRWKD) (in USA dollars), 
and the harmonised percentage unemployment rate (HUR) for the 36 countries for 
which such data were available for 2016 (OECD 2018a; b). What it demonstrates is 
that there is no correlation between the two indicators, with a correlation coefficient 
value of R2 = 0.016.
It is seen that the country with the highest productivity ($82.15) was Ireland, 
which had an HUR of 8.4%. The country with the lowest productivity ($18.74) was 
Mexico, which had an HUR of 3.9%. They are two very different countries, with 
very different profiles of economic activity, but they serve to illustrate the variations 
between countries and how productivity and unemployment are not directly related. 
One factor is that countries that have comparatively low unemployment will have 
found/created employment for those people who would otherwise have not obtained 
employment because of their relatively poor skills and qualifications. Therefore, the 
jobs involved will not necessarily be highly paid, and hence, this will drag down 
the overall labour productivity. The corollary is that countries with high labour pro-
ductivity and high unemployment have the former artificially inflated because of 
the latter. In light of the above, the authors believe that the proposed SLPI presents 
an initial (proxy) means of examining and monitoring patterns of productivity and 
unemployment worldwide, which can be readily applied, because it uses data that is 
already collected and published. These patterns, and any associated dynamics over 
1 3
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time, should enable governments and agencies to identify outliers and raise ques-
tions about the relationship which will help target future investigation, research, and 
actions.
Assumptions for SLPI formula
As stated above, the purpose of the SLPI is to compare countries’ GDP with their 
total workforce, rather than just people in work, as does the labour productivity 
index. Therefore, it needs to take into account levels of unemployment whilst uti-
lising readily available data. Table 1 sets out the basic formulaic assumptions uti-
lised in creating the SLPI and the following section shows how it was developed. 
But first, an outline of the developmental approach is required. Each country will 
have its existing performance-related data, and each is given the suffix ‘e’ (for ‘exist-
ing’): Ge = published GDP; Pe = published labour productivity index; Te = total 
existing full-time and part-time workers; Ue = existing number of unemployed; and 
βe% = existing unemployment rate. What the SLPI does is to make a projection of 
what productivity would be if there was a uniform (minimum) level of unemploy-
ment across all countries. Therefore, there needs to be ‘projected’ data and how 
these are calculated is shown in Table  1. All such data are given the suffix ‘p’: 
Gp = projected GDP; Pp = projected labour productivity index; Tp = total projected 
full-time and part-time workers; Up = projected number of unemployed; βp% = pro-
jected unemployment rate; and  NEp = projected newly employed. However, it must 
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be emphasised that the ‘projection’ relates to a projected alternative contemporary 
scenario rather than a projection into the future.
What is critical is that a factor α is needed. This reflects the reasonable assump-
tion that if a country with high labour productivity and high unemployment were 
to create work that helps to (significantly) reduce unemployment, then on average 
the pay and productivity of the new jobs, and therefore the newly employed, will 
be lower than those already in existence. Consequently, α will have a value < 1, to 
reflect the specific labour productivity of the newly employed relative to the existing 
labour productivity. Therefore, the SLPI formula described below takes the ‘exist-
ing’ (published) values for the various related statistics, and then makes a ‘projec-
tion’ of what they would become if the stated assumptions were applied, for the 
same point in time. Of course, as countries’ GDP values vary from year to year, 
corresponding values of the SLPI would be calculated for each year’s GDP values.
The following key assumptions are made:
• A country’s existing GDP  (GDPe) is fixed for the purposes of calculations (for 
any given point in time).
• The existing unemployment rate of βe% changes to an assigned/predicted (stand-
ard) unemployment rate of βp%
• The mean total hours worked of all persons engaged in production (THW) of 
existing workers and newly employed workers is the same (otherwise, a new 
factor γ would be required to distinguish the relative working hours patterns 
between new and existing workers; γ could be greater or less than 1); alterna-
tively, it could be envisioned that this is covered by the value of α
Development of SLPI formula
Set out below is the construction of the SLPI formula based on the above assump-
tions. The authors did not have access to the ideal, primary data and, therefore, 
Table 1  Key formulaic assumptions
A all available workers, G GDP, NE newly employed workers, P productivity, T total full-time and part-
time workers, U no. unemployed
A = Te + Ue = Tp + Up
Up = Ue − NEp
NEp = Ue – Up = Tp − Te
βe% = Unemployment  Ratee = (Ue × 100)/A
βp% = Unemployment  Ratep = (Up × 100)/A
Employment  Ratee = Te/A
Employment  Ratep = Tp/A
Up = (βp% × A)/100
Productivitye = GDPe/Te
Productivityp = GDPp/(Te + NEp)
GDPp = GDPe + GDP of newly employed workers
GDP of newly employed workers = (α × Pe) ×  NEp
GDPp = GDPe + ((α × Pe) ×  NEp)
 = GDPe × (Te + (α ×  NEp))/Te
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necessarily utilised relevant publically available data. What is demonstrated is that 
the SLPI uses publically available data and is consistent with existing indices:
This formula enables the SLPI to be calculated for all countries using readily 
published data. It requires a minimum unemployment rate to be set, so that all coun-
tries are brought to an equal level, to establish the impact of the index. It represents 
the most basic version of the index, as it is important to first determine its veracity 
and potential to contribute to the debate about productivity before seeking greater 
sophistication; suggestions for the latter are presented in ‘Further Research’ below.
SLPI = Gp∕(Te + NEp).
=
(
Ge +
((
 x Pe
)
x NEp
))
∕
(
Te + NEp
) [
Pe = Ge∕Te; and Tp = Te + NEp
]
;
=
(((
Gex Te
)
+
(
 xGex NEp
))
∕Te
)
∕Tp.
=
(
Gex
(
Te +
(
 x NEp
)))
∕ (Tex Tp).
= Pex
(
Te +
(
 x NEp
))
∕Tp
[
NEp = Tp − Te
]
.
= Pex
((
Te +
(
 x
(
Tp − Te
)))
∕Tp
) [
Multiply numerator and denominator by A
]
.
= Pex
((
Te +
(
 x
(
Tp − Te
)))
∕Tp
)
x (A∕A).
= Pex
(
A∕Tp
)
x (
(
Te∕A
)
+
(
 Tp∕A
)
−
(
 Te∕A
)
).
= Pex
(
A∕Tp
)
x (
((
(1 − )xTe
)
∕A
)
+
(
 Tp∕A
)
).
= Pex
((
(1 − )x Employment Ratee
)
+
(
 x Employment Ratep
))
∕Employment Ratep.
Because Employment Ratee =
(
1 − e
)
and Employment Ratep = (1 − p).
SLPI = Existing Labour Productivity ×
(
(1 − )
(
1 − e
))
+
(

(
1 − p
))
(
1 − p
) .
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Methodology
The methodology applied is primarily descriptive and empirical. This is because it 
was necessary to (a) determine whether the SLPI could actually be calculated, and 
(b) establish if the SLPI shows different patterns to the labour productivity index. 
The latter was important, because if the SLPI did not show any difference from 
the labour productivity index, then it would not be providing additional insight. As 
mentioned above an econometric approach which sought to establish causal rela-
tionships would be ideal, but unfortunately the limited availability of related inter-
national standardised data meant that this was outside the scope of this research. 
Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the usage of the SLPI could raise questions which 
would help target future econometric research.
The SLPI model was calculated for 2016 for countries across the world where 
data from the OECD were available for each of the GDPHRWKD (OECD 2018a) 
and the HUR (OECD 2018b). Values of α were varied for the full range of decile 
values from 0.1 to 0.9, and βp took on values 3.0, 3.5, 4.0, 4.5, and 5.0, given that 
the lowest HUR was 3.01 (Iceland).
To examine patterns in the SLPI over time, it was decided to focus attention on 
historical data for some ‘sentinel’ countries. Those chosen were the G7 (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States of America) and the 
‘PIGS’ countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain). The latter was chosen as 
a recognised counterbalance to the former, given their negative growth rates due to 
their banking sectors being severely hit by the 2008 financial crisis (OECD 2016). 
The additional years chosen were: 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011 (the lat-
ter two to show the impact of the 2008 financial crisis). It was deemed appropriate 
to exclude East European countries because of their being communist states histori-
cally, and during part of the period covered by the analyses. (However, some con-
sideration is afforded to East Germany, to the extent that it was absorbed by West 
Germany in the reunification process from 1989.)
It should be highlighted that standard values were set for βp for the purposes of 
this paper to establish the comparative impact of standard values across all coun-
tries. However, it is fair to say that most countries with high levels of unemployment 
in 2016 [e.g., Greece (23.6%) and Spain (19.65%)] would struggle to attain such low 
levels. The next stage of development for the SLPI could include values for βp being 
set for each country individually (see Further Research below). It was considered to 
be inappropriate to have undertaken such variations in values here, because it would 
simply have involved guesswork on the part of the authors. The analyses undertaken 
effectively represent sensitivity analyses of the SLPI, albeit within the stated limited 
range for βp. If non-standardised values of βp were required for individual countries, 
then either they could be agreed as set target levels of unemployment, or a process 
of delphi methods could be applied to determine best predictions; given that they 
are well-established and have been used successfully for many purposes (Gupta and 
Clarke 1996; Linstone and Turoff 1975).
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Results
Table 2 shows the SLPI calculations for the 36 countries that had both the GDPHR-
WKD and the HUR for 2016. (Countries excluded because of insufficient data 
included Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Russia.) It only shows the SLPI calcula-
tions for α values of 0.5 and 0.1 (i.e., the mid-range and extreme values). This is for 
presentational purposes, because the differences in the SLPI calculations for each 
incremental 0.1 change in α values were constant for each country (but obviously 
varied between countries). The value for βp shown was 3.0. The table shows the 
percentage reduction on the GDPHRWKD for each SLPI calculation to gauge the 
impact of using the SLPI rather than the GDPHRWKD. Finally, it shows the rank-
ing of the 36 countries for each of the six figures. The countries are shown ranked 
for the percentage reduction achieved by the SLPI where α was 0.5. It is clear that 
the countries with the highest HUR see the SLPI values which have the greatest dif-
ference to the GDPHRWKD, which in part is the nature of the construction of the 
SLPI.
Table 2 and Fig. 4, which show the SLPI values for each country for each incre-
mental value of α, show great divergence between the different countries for both 
the GDPHRWKD [18.74 (Mexico) to 82.15 (Ireland)] and the HUR [3.01 (Iceland) 
to 23.6 (Greece)]. The SLPI values effectively are straight lines for each country, as 
would be expected. The GDPHRWKD range is so large that the calculation of the 
SLPI does not lead to any major variations in countries’ rankings. The three stand-
out highest performers were Ireland, Luxembourg and Norway, which each were 
23% or more greater than the fourth-ranked country (Belgium) for the GDPHRWKD 
and 25% or greater for the SLPI where α = 0.5. There were then different clusters of 
countries with broadly similar figures, with the lowest encompassing Mexico, Chile, 
and Latvia. However, it is noticeable that Greece moved from a higher group into 
this latter group for the SLPI because of its high unemployment, which at 23.57% 
meant that the SLPI (α = 0.5) was 10.60% lower than its GDPHRWKD.
The eight countries which had their SLPI (α = 0.5) value 3.00% or lower than 
their GDPHRWKD included two countries from the G7 (France and Italy) and three 
countries that were amongst the PIGS group, viz., Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Of 
course, for the many countries with low HUR figures, the SLPI showed little differ-
ence to the GDPHRWKD.
The research involved calculation of the SLPI for the following βp values: 3.0, 
3.5, 4.0, 4.5, and 5.0. It was found that, for SLPI (α = 0.5), the minimum value 
for βp = 3.0 was 18.66 (Mexico) and the maximum was 79.86 (Ireland); for SLPI 
(α = 0.1), the minimum value for βp = 3.0 was 18.59 (Mexico) and the maximum was 
78.65 (Luxembourg). However, when βp was increased to 5.0, the SLPI (α = 0.5) had 
a minimum value of 18.85 (Mexico) and maximum of 80.67 (Ireland); and SLPI 
(α = 0.1) minimum value was 18.94 (Mexico) and the maximum was 80.14 (Lux-
embourg). That the differences between corresponding SLPI figures for the differ-
ent values of βp were limited led to the decision to only present those in relation to 
βp = 3.0 in the tables and figures.
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available for 2016
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Table 3  Trends over time (1986–2016) for G7 and PIGS countries for key indicators (with βp = 3.0)
GDPHRWKD 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
France 39.2 43.9 47.9 52.9 57.1 57.0 58.9
Germany 36.5 42.1 46.9 52.0 55.4 57.4 60.0
Greece 23.7 25.5 26.0 30.1 33.5 31.9 30.9
Ireland 24.4 30.9 37.3 45.7 52.2 64.9 82.1
Italy 36.9 40.5 44.9 47.5 47.5 47.4 47.7
Portugal 20.3 24.2 26.1 28.1 29.9 31.8 32.3
Spain 35.2 37.2 41.1 40.9 41.6 44.9 47.1
United Kingdom 30.0 32.1 37.2 42.1 46.8 47.6 48.1
Canada 34.9 35.8 38.4 42.8 45.3 47.0 48.9
Japan 23.3 29.0 32.3 35.7 38.4 39.6 41.5
United States 40.0 42.4 45.6 51.1 57.3 62.1 63.5
Harmonised unemployment rate (HUR) 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
France 10.6 9.6 12.4 8.7 8.8 9.2 10.1
Germany 5.5 8.9 7.9 10.3 5.8 4.1
Greece 10.7 9.0 17.9 23.6
Ireland 16.8 14.8 11.7 4.2 4.8 15.4 8.4
Italy 8.9 8.5 11.2 9.0 6.8 8.4 11.7
Portugal 8.8 4.2 7.2 5.1 8.9 12.9 11.2
Spain 15.5 19.9 10.6 8.5 21.4 19.7
United Kingdom 11.2 8.6 7.9 5.0 5.4 8.1 4.8
Canada 9.7 10.3 9.6 7.2 6.3 7.5 7.0
Japan 2.8 2.1 3.4 5.0 4.1 4.6 3.1
United States 7.0 6.8 5.4 4.7 4.6 9.0 4.9
SLPI (α = 0.5) 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
France 37.66 42.36 45.59 51.32 55.39 55.21 56.80
Germany 41.51 45.45 50.65 53.33 56.58 59.65
Greece 28.95 32.43 29.44 27.60
Ireland 22.69 28.98 35.61 45.45 51.69 60.71 79.86
Italy 35.77 39.31 43.02 46.04 46.60 46.12 45.57
Portugal 19.66 24.07 25.51 27.76 28.97 30.20 30.92
Spain 34.81 37.52 39.29 40.43 40.68 43.04
United Kingdom 28.73 31.22 36.26 41.68 46.24 46.40 47.66
Canada 33.74 34.44 37.06 41.88 44.55 45.91 47.91
Japan 23.29 29.18 32.19 35.34 38.20 39.26 41.51
United States 39.18 41.54 45.00 50.67 56.86 60.23 62.84
Percentage reduction of SLPI (α = 0.5)  
on GDPHRWKD
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
France 3.9% 3.4% 4.8% 3.0% 3.0% 3.2% 3.6%
Germany 1.3% 3.1% 2.5% 3.8% 1.5% 0.6%
Greece 4.0% 3.1% 7.7% 10.6%
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However, it should be noted that when the value of βp was increased, those coun-
tries that they had an HUR value less than βp had SLPI values greater than the 
GDPHRWKD.
Table 3 provides details of the GDPHRWKD, the HUR, the SLPI (α = 0.5), and 
the percentage reduction of SLPI (α = 0.5) on the GDPHRWKD for the 11 chosen 
countries for each of 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, and 2016. Figure 5 shows 
that GDPHRWKD and SLPI (α = 0.5) follow similar trajectories to one another. The 
HUR and the percentage reduction of SLPI (α = 0.5) also follow similar trajecto-
ries to one another, but they are markedly different from the other pair. This dem-
onstrates that the SLPI (α = 0.5) is something of a refinement of the GDPHRWKD 
which responds to and reflects levels of unemployment (over time).
A sensitivity analysis was undertaken to establish the range of SLPI values that 
resulted from making the most extreme assumptions, within the ranges stated, for 
the 11 countries. This was between SLPI values for βp = 5.0 and α = 0.9 and βp = 3.0 
and α = 0.1. The percentage difference of the latter from the former was (in descend-
ing order): Greece (17.5%); Spain (14.1%); Italy (7.4%); Portugal (7.0%); France 
(6.1%); Ireland (4.7%); Canada (3.5%); USA (1.7%); UK (1.7%); Germany (1.1%); 
and Japan (0.3%).
Discussion
Results
The results show that the SLPI is very relevant for countries that have high unem-
ployment and that it reflects variations in unemployment levels over time. It does 
not make a great deal of difference from the GDPHRWKD for low unemployment 
countries, but, of course, its whole purpose is to suitably relate to countries’ whole 
population available for work. The observed wide distribution of GDPHRWKD 
draws the inference that there should be individual values of α for each country. 
Table 3  (continued)
Percentage reduction of SLPI (α = 0.5)  
on GDPHRWKD
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
Ireland 7.1% 6.1% 4.5% 0.6% 0.9% 6.4% 2.8%
Italy 3.0% 2.8% 4.2% 3.1% 2.0% 2.8% 4.5%
Portugal 3.0% 0.6% 2.2% 1.1% 3.0% 5.1% 4.2%
Spain 6.4% 8.7% 3.9% 2.8% 9.5% 8.6%
United Kingdom 4.2% 2.9% 2.5% 1.0% 1.2% 2.6% 0.9%
Canada 3.4% 3.8% 3.4% 2.2% 1.7% 2.3% 2.1%
Japan − 0.1% − 0.5% 0.2% 1.0% 0.6% 0.8% 0.1%
United States 2.1% 2.0% 1.2% 0.9% 0.8% 3.1% 1.0%
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Fig. 5  Trends over time (1986–2016) for G7 and PIGS countries for key indicators (with βp = 3.0)
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This is because, in the short-term future at least, new jobs which take large numbers 
of people from unemployment are likely to be of a comparatively low productivity, 
particularly if they are in the service sector (Feldstein 2017). That unemployment 
will continue to be a factor in many countries following the Covid-19 pandemic, 
even some that had favourably low rates beforehand, is a reasonable assumption; 
particularly as chronic problems such as high youth unemployment were not fully 
successfully addressed in prior years.
The ratio of the service sector’s productivity against the prevailing overall pro-
ductivity for each country will vary, and would be very noticeable for high perform-
ers such as Ireland, Luxembourg, and Norway. There would probably be lower val-
ues of α for countries with high GDPHRWKD and higher values for those with low 
GDPHRWKD.
There are potential options for determining individual values of α for each coun-
try. One is for there to be one (internationally) agreed sector that all such values 
relate to, e.g., the ‘Food And Beverage Service Activities’ sector; the value of α for 
each country would then be that country’s GDPHRWKD for ‘Food And Beverage 
Service Activities’ divided by its overall GDPHRWKD (which would allow for the 
fact that the GDPHRWKD for ‘Food And Beverage Service Activities’ will vary 
between countries). Another option would be for each country to designate which 
sector would be most likely to expand and take on its unemployed—which could 
vary between different countries. This would mean that the value of α for each coun-
try would then be that country’s GDPHRWKD for its ‘selected sector’ divided by 
its overall GDPHRWKD. Of course, for both such options, and any others, it might 
be preferable to use a combination of sectors rather than just one alone. This whole 
issue would be a subject for further research.
That the ranking of countries for the SLPI is virtually the same as the GDPHR-
WKD does not reflect a problem in the SLPI, but more of a problem with the 
GDPHRWKD. It is arguable that labour productivity in the ‘high performance’ 
countries is skewed: Ireland hosts the information technology headquarters of many 
multinational companies and has a significant inflow of foreign direct investment 
(the latter also applies to Luxembourg) (OECD 2016) and Norway’s economy relies 
heavily on the extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas, which is generally the 
highest labour productivity sector of all. Also, all three have comparatively small 
populations. Therefore, it could be argued that the GDPHRWKD values for these 
countries provide ‘false’ comparisons with larger countries, whose economies have 
greater emphasis on sectors which have lower productivity. Such extreme values 
arguably undermine the efficacy of the GDPHRWKD, which should be subject to 
some agreed form of standardisation (see below).
It can be seen that the SLPI can accommodate varying values of βp, even for 
countries where the HUR is lower. For example, Iceland, which had the lowest 
HUR value of 3.01, and had an SLPI (α = 0.5) value of 54.32 and an SLPI (α = 0.1) 
value of 54.77 compared to a GDPHRWKD of 53.76 when βp  = 5.0. This is not an 
issue, as it demonstrates that the SLPI implicitly assumes that (a) unemployment 
had increased and (b) the jobs shed were those of a lower productivity than the aver-
age for the country (the relationship determined by the value of α), meaning that 
the average increased accordingly. The sensitivity analysis comparing SLPI values 
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for βp = 5.0 and α = 0.9 and βp = 3.0 and α = 0.1 served to highlight that there can be 
marked differences depending upon the assumptions made, particularly for countries 
with existing high unemployment. This in turn suggests that the values of α and βp 
should be set for each country individually (see Further Research).
With regards to the various issues relating to unemployment and production 
(e.g., labour hoarding), the SLPI does not measure them per se; and some of them 
are qualitative issues rather than quantitative issues. To isolate each from the other 
would be very difficult, and so the SLPI is a high-level proxy measure aimed at 
countries’ whole workforces and economies.
Need for standardisation of labour productivity
It is self-evident that labour productivity will vary between different economic sec-
tors. The UK uses the Standard Industrial Classification SIC2007 (ONS 2019a; b) 
which is compatible with the European Community’s statistical classification of 
economic activities (NACE Rev.2) (European Commission 2019). Scrutiny of UK 
output per hour values (seasonally adjusted, at current prices and in £) for the 67 
different industrial/ economic categories quoted in Quarter 4 of 2018 (ONS 2019b) 
showed very wide variations. These ranged from the minimum of £9.51 (Security 
and Investigation Activities) to the maximum of £1254.23 (Extraction of Crude 
Petroleum and Natural Gas). The median value was £35.00 (Computer Program-
ming, Consultancy and Related Activities). However, it is notable that values for 
‘Extraction of Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas’ can vary wildly—the Quarter 3 
2018 value was £720.33! Unsurprisingly, this sector usually has the highest produc-
tivity of all UK sectors—only in three Quarters over the period 1997–2018 was its 
output per hour exceeded by another sector (‘Real Estate’ in each case).
The UK has been well known for being reliant on the service sector, and this is 
a marked change historically. The ONS (2016b) highlighted five facts about the UK 
service sector: 79% of UK GDP came from the service sector in 2013; the percent-
age of workers in the service sector rose from 33% in 1841 to 80% in 2011; the ser-
vice sector dominates London’s economy (91%); the UK’s economy is more reliant 
on the service sector than any other G7 country; and the service sector has driven 
the economic recovery since the downturn in 2008. However, most service sector 
categories have comparably low labour productivity, and therefore, this is one of the 
reasons for the UK’s comparatively low overall labour productivity.
As an example of how the dynamics of the UK’s economy could have impacted 
on its labour productivity value, based on pre-Covid-19 pandemic projections, it is 
informative to look at pubs and coffee shops, which will come under the category 
of ‘Food And Beverage Service Activities’; which had an output per hour value of 
£17.60 for Q4 2018 (half of the median value) and was ranked 60 out of the 67 
categories. ONS (2018c) data confirms the large fall in the number of pubs, from 
around 50,000 pubs in 2008 to around 39,000 pubs in 2018. However, in 2008, 
UK pubs had a median number of five employees, but by 2018 (partly due to the 
closure of many smaller pubs), this had increased to eight employees. Therefore, 
despite the fall in pub numbers, the number of employees in pubs (2015–2018) has 
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stayed around 450,000, higher than at any time since 2002. Over a similar period 
(2007–2018), the number of UK coffee shops has increased from 10,000 to 24,000, 
with over three new coffee shops opening every day; a trend that could mean that the 
number of UK coffee shops overtakes the number of pubs by 2030 (Poulter 2018). 
This is why Tenreyo’s comment earlier in the paper is misleading: the UK economy 
is expanding and employment increasing in part because of the continuing trends in 
‘Food And Beverage Service Activities’; but because it is a low labour productivity 
sector, such expansion will drag down the overall value for the UK. One absurd way 
to increase the UK’s labour productivity would be to close all pubs and coffee shops 
and make all of the staff unemployed—because this would remove a huge low-pro-
ductivity component of the UK economy and because the labour productivity index 
does not allow for the unemployed! Of course, this would be ridiculous, but it serves 
to highlight a key limitation of the labour productivity index.
By way of comparison, it is interesting to note that Europe’s biggest economy, 
Germany, promised to phase out coal production by 2038 to meet its climate change 
commitments. Yet, it has controversially begun expanding one of its biggest open-
cast lignite mines, at Hambach, which is 48 square kilometres in size (Oltermann 
2019; Thomson 2019). The labour productivity of this development will be very 
high as it will only involve around 1300 employees because of its using the larg-
est automated machinery in the world (RWE 2020). This serves to highlight how 
misleading crude international comparisons can be using the unweighted labour pro-
ductivity index; it is arguably down to luck that such a large, rich mineral deposit so 
close to the surface happened to be in Germany.
The countries with the highest productivity referred to above (Ireland, Luxem-
bourg and Norway) all have economies skewed towards sectors that have high pro-
ductivity. This too serves to illustrate the need for any international comparisons of 
labour productivity to involve standardisation. In another field such as epidemiol-
ogy, it is possible for one population to have a higher death rate for each age–sex 
group compared to another population, but have a lower overall death rate, because 
the age-sex structures of the two populations are very different. Hence, international 
comparisons utilise standardised mortality (ONS 2018d). There is no reason in the-
ory why this could not equally apply to the labour productivity index, because labour 
productivity varies between different economic sectors and the balance of economic 
sectors in different countries will also vary. A country’s standardised productivity 
rate would not alter as some sectors expand and others contract, as would be likely 
to happen with the existing labour productivity index, if the sector-specific produc-
tivity values remained constant. Of course, this would require labour productivity 
rates to be calculated for each set sector in each country and then applied to an inter-
nationally agreed mix of economic sectors. But until such a development is made, it 
is inappropriate for the media to wheel out ‘experts’ every time labour productivity 
figures are published, who then berate UK industry for poor performance with com-
ments along the lines of that made by Tenreyo above. If the uncertain impact of 
Brexit on the UK’s labour productivity (Bloom et al. 2019) can be put to one side, 
then the authors suspect that any differentials between the UK and its competitors 
would reduce, if not disappear in some cases, if standardisation were to take place.
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Limitations
The prime purpose of the research was to determine whether the SLPI represented a 
valid index which was sufficiently different from the GDPHRWKD to add comple-
mentary value. Accordingly, SLPI analyses presented deal with a basic model, from 
which further research can explore greater sophistication. They necessarily made 
certain pragmatic assumptions, given that some potentially relevant data were not 
ready to hand and might not be available for a large number of countries (if indeed 
it is available in published form at all). One limitation was that a single value of α 
was assumed in each set of results, when the value will undoubtedly vary between 
countries and be influenced by whether an economy is expanding or contracting, 
given the productivity of new employees. Another limitation, highlighted from the 
outset, was the assumption that the THW of existing workers and newly employed 
workers are the same. How these limitations might be addressed by further research 
is discussed below. None of these limitations detracts from the principle that the 
model presents a useful and complementary measure which addresses the fact that 
GDPHRWKD does not allow for unemployment.
The assumption that α has a value < 1 is considered to be entirely valid. How-
ever, some countries have seen their domestic economies significantly contract as a 
result of, for example, severe austerity measures; and many will see economic con-
traction due to the Covid-19 pandemic. As has been described, one by-product of 
this is that skilled and unskilled workers migrate to other countries to find employ-
ment; but this is unlikely to be uniform between countries, for example in the case 
of the EU. A similar issue relates to cross-border migration, where a person lives 
in one country and travels to work in another country, such as in the Benelux and 
neighbouring countries. The impact of both types of migration on the value of α 
would require a great deal of complex data; and consequently should be the subject 
of further research.
Complexity in an uncertain world
As has been highlighted above, there are many complex factors affecting both pro-
ductivity and unemployment, and the world will be a different place as a result of 
the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, there is likely to be increased repatriation or 
re-shoring of manufacturing to the USA and UK (Vanchan et al. 2018), and there is 
growing concern with the world’s reliance on China’s manufacturing supply chains 
(Serhan and Gilsinan 2020). Also, there may be changes in migration patterns, and 
the opportunities that have encouraged migration, which could impact on the size 
and skill mix of the available workforces, both in countries that have traditionally 
attracted immigrants and countries from which people have emigrated. Accordingly, 
the limitations of the labour productivity index may well become exposed. In the 
absence of the ideally required econometric research to develop new sophisticated 
economic measurement and productivity statistics, the proposed SLPI can act as a 
straightforward proxy measure, to complement the labour productivity index. It can 
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be readily utilised for evaluation and monitoring both short- and long-term trends; 
and identifying outliers which might point to appropriate action and/or research.
Further research
It is accepted that the SLPI as described can be further developed if relevant data 
become available. Possibilities relate to the values of α and γ. The value of α reflects 
the specific labour productivity of the newly employed relative to the existing labour 
productivity and will be largely influenced by five issues. The first is the sector(s) in 
which any new jobs occur; for example, if jobs are being lost in high-productivity 
sectors and replaced by jobs in low-productivity sectors, then the balance will shift 
accordingly. Second, as stated above, it is likely that there should be values spe-
cific to each individual country. Third, it will take some time before an average new 
employee will achieve optimal productivity; some estimates suggest that it takes 
1–2 years (Oakes 2012), and of course, this may be influenced by whether the new 
employee is full or part-time. Fourth, the impact of significant migration between 
countries for both skilled and unskilled workers is unlikely to be uniform, as men-
tioned above. The final issue is whether an economy is in the process of expand-
ing or contracting, as this will impact on the level of new employees. Nevertheless, 
it would be desirable to undertake research to establish a specific range of values 
for α that appropriately reflects ‘real-life’, given that this research had to assume 
a full range from 0.1 to 0.9 in the absence of relevant data. Such a range would 
then support sensitivity analyses.UK employment statistics are compiled for the 
Labour Force Survey (ONS 2019c) and this topic might potentially be investigated 
by microdata analysis of its data.
With regards to γ, it was necessary to assume that the mean THW of all persons 
engaged in production was the same for both existing and newly employed work-
ers, irrespective of sector or country, because of an absence of relevant data. Whilst 
being pragmatic, it is unlikely that this will universally be the case, particularly with 
developments in the ‘gig economy’ and zero-hour contracts. For example, work-
ers on zero-hour contracts accounted for over a quarter (26.8%) of overall employ-
ment growth in the UK over the period 2012–2017, having more than tripled from 
252,000 to 901,000 workers [It is noted that increased recognition and awareness 
of these types of contracts led to a large increase between 2012 and 2013, thereby 
complicating comparisons with 2012 and earlier years (ONS 2014).] Overall, it has 
been estimated that the UK ‘gig economy’ employs more than 2.8 million workers 
(Sharma 2018). Therefore, this is a topic that would benefit from greater investiga-
tion. Again, Labour Force Survey data might enable related analyses.
The need for a standardised labour productivity index to allow for variations in 
productivity between different economic sectors and the balance of economic sec-
tors in different countries has been highlighted. Ultimately, this would need to incor-
porate an internationally agreed mix of economic sectors.
Any similar standardisation relating to the SLPI would be more complex, par-
ticularly with regard to setting a value, or values for α. There would also need to be 
a view taken about how to (consistently) attribute the unemployed to each sector 
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given that some people will move between jobs in different sectors either by choice 
or because of circumstances, e.g., the demise of one particular sector in a given 
geographical region will undoubtedly force some people to work in another sector 
if they do not wish to move away from that region. Such research would only be 
undertaken following on from the acceptance of the SLPI as a useful complemen-
tary measure to accompany labour productivity and the production of standardised 
labour productivity rates.
Conclusions
The results show that there is no correlation between countries’ labour productiv-
ity and unemployment rates, and that the SLPI provides markedly different patterns 
over time to the labour productivity index for countries with high(er) unemployment. 
The Covid-19 pandemic will have a major impact on economies across the world, 
with reductions in GDP and the speed and degree of recovery inevitably varying. It 
is projected that there will be associated large increases in unemployment, with the 
greatest impact likely to be in lower skilled and lower productivity sectors, such as 
tourism and retail; potentially having the counter-intuitive effect of the labour pro-
ductivity index actually increasing for some countries, because it only measures the 
productivity of those in work. The recent trends in international migration (of all 
types) could well serve to exacerbate the numbers and skill mix of the unemployed. 
In the circumstances, a wider perspective of productivity is necessary; and levels of 
unemployment should be taken into account when considering countries’ productiv-
ity to gain a broader appreciation of the dynamics of their economies.
The relationship between employment and productivity is complex, and the 
SLPI represents a practicable high-level proxy measure aimed at countries’ whole 
workforces and economies. It can be utilised quickly in these unprecedented times 
to complement the labour productivity index when considering international com-
parisons of productivity; arguably providing a better measure of countries’ overall 
economic and social health. It uses data routinely collected and already available, 
which would be supplemented by assumptions/predictions about values of α and β to 
model differing potential scenarios. Sensitivity analyses which vary these assump-
tions can sit alongside GDP and labour productivity index predictions.
The results also showed that the range of existing values for the labour produc-
tivity index is so wide that the SLPI does not affect relative rankings of countries, 
but it is considered that this was more due to vagaries of the labour productivity 
index. One of these is that in its crude form, the labour productivity index does not 
allow for countries’ varying balances between economic sectors. Therefore, an inter-
nationally agreed standardised labour productivity index should be introduced; the 
authors anticipate that this would serve to narrow the range of values.
The proposed SLPI in this paper is in effect a basic model that is capable of fur-
ther development in sophistication with access to more detailed data that were not 
available to the authors. It is concluded that the SLPI contributes positively to the 
1 3
SN Bus Econ            (2021) 1:10  Page 33 of 38    10 
debate about the labour productivity index and addresses some of its acknowledged 
limitations.
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